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Abstract
A general method is given for revising degrees of belief and arriving
at consistent decisions about a system of logically constrained issues.
In contrast to other works about belief revision, here the constraints
are assumed to be fixed. The method has two variants, dual of each
other, whose revised degrees of belief are respectively above and below
the original ones. The upper [resp. lower] revised degrees of belief
are uniquely characterized as the lowest [resp. greatest] ones that are
invariant by a certain max-min [resp. min-max] operation determined
by the logical constraints. In both variants, making balance between
the revised degree of belief of a proposition and that of its negation
leads to decisions that are ensured to be consistent with the logical
constraints. These decisions are ensured to agree with the majority
criterion as applied to the original degrees of belief whenever this gives
a consistent result. They are also ensured to satisfy a property of
respect for unanimity about any particular issue, as well as a property
of monotonicity with respect to the original degrees of belief. The
application of the method to certain special domains comes down to
well established or increasingly accepted methods, such as the single-
link method of cluster analysis and the method of paths in preferential
voting.
Keywords: constrained judgment aggregation, degrees of belief,
belief revision, plausible reasoning, artificial intelligence, decision
theory, doctrinal paradox, cluster analysis, preferential voting,
conjunctive normal forms.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Around 1990 Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager pointed out
that collegial courts are liable to what they termed the doctrinal paradox
[14, 15 ]. A simple example of it would be the following: A person is on trial
for having committed a crime. The case involves two issues p and q whose
conjunction, i. e. both of them being true, determines whether the accused is
guilty or not. The case is heard by a jury of three members. One of them
believes that p is true but not q ; accordingly, he finds the accused not guilty.
Another one believes that q is true but not p ; so he also finds the accused
not guilty. Finally, the third member of the jury believes that both p and
q are true, so he finds the accused guilty. Altogether, one can say that the
jury has reached a majority verdict of not guilty. However, one can also say
that they have a majority opinion that p is true and that q is also true;
accordingly, the accused should be considered guilty. The above-mentioned
authors acknowledge that “We have no clear understanding of how a court
should proceed in cases where the doctrinal paradox arises” [15 ].
The main issue in a trial is whether the accused is guilty or not. Let t
denote the proposition that he is guilty. We are assuming that this proposi-
tion is logically connected to p and q as specified by the following doctrine:
t ↔ p ∧ q . Every member of the jury is required to be consistent with it.
Therefore, there are only four consistent opinions about the truth of (p, q, t),
namely: (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0), where 1 means true, and
0 means false. Let us consider all possibilities for a jury that is hearing such
a case: let x, y, z, u be the fractions who adhere to, respectively, each of
those four consistent opinions. In terms of these numbers, the fractions of
the jury who believe in the truth of t, p, q are respectively vt = x , vp = x+y
and vq = x+ z . These numbers can be seen as degrees of collective belief in
the truth of the respective propositions. A natural criterion for collectively
deciding about t is to consider it true whenever vt >
1
2
, i. e. x > 1
2
. In
the following we will refer to it as the conclusion-based criterion . In
contrast, the premise-based criterion considers t true if and only if both
vp, vq >
1
2
, i. e. both x+y, x+z > 1
2
. Clearly, if t is found true by the
conclusion-based criterion, then it will also be found true by the premise-
based one. However, the converse does not hold, as it is exemplified in the
preceding paragraph, where vp = vq =
2
3
> 1
2
but vt =
1
3
< 1
2
.
1.2 The core of the problem is that the majority rule does not keep con-
sistency with the doctrine. Even though each individual votes in a consis-
tent way, the outcome of the majority rule need not be consistent! By the
majority rule we mean accepting a proposition α and rejecting its negation
α whenever vα >
1
2
.
Deciding about logically constrained issues, § 1 3
From this point of view, the problem is entirely analogous to the well-
known paradox pointed out in the eighteenth century by the Marquis of
Condorcet in connection with preferential voting [19 ]: When several individ-
uals vote on three or more alternatives by ordering them according to their
preferences, the majority rule may result in a cyclic (i. e. non transitive)
binary relation. In preferential voting one is interested in the propositions
pxy : ‘x is preferable to y ’, where x and y vary over all possible pairs of
alternatives, and the doctrine is transitivity, namely pxy ∧ pyz → pxz for any
three alternatives x, y, z , together with asymmetry, namely pxy → pyx for
any two alternatives x, y . As before, the problem is that the majority rule
does not keep consistency with the doctrine. The standard example involves
three alternatives a, b, c and three rankings, namely a  b  c , b  c  a
and c  a  b . If vxy denotes the fraction of times that x is preferred to y ,
one gets vab = vbc = vca =
2
3
and vba = vcb = vac =
1
3
. Clearly, the condition
vxy >
1
2
does not define a transitive relation.
Yet another class of objects whose aggregation and subsequent applica-
tion of the majority rule may break away from the corresponding doctrine
are equivalence relations. Consider, for example, the set {a, b, c} and the
equivalence relations associated respectively with the three following parti-
tions: {{a, b}, {c}} , {{a}, {b, c}} and {{a, b, c}} . If vxy denotes the fraction
of times that x and y belong to the same class, one gets vab = vbc =
2
3
and
vac =
1
3
(together with vyx = vxy ). Here too, the aggregation operation does
away with transitivity.
All these problems are particular cases of a more general one where the
objects being aggregated are systems of degrees of belief for several propo-
sitions which are logically constrained by a certain doctrine. This general
problem can be referred to as that of constrained judgment aggregation.
In a celebrated paper published in 1952, Georges Th. Guilbaud already iden-
tified this problem as a generalization of Condorcet’s one: “The general logic
of propositions ... teaches us that the problem is universal. Given several
propositions or questions, every logical relation between them can be ex-
pressed by establishing the list of possible arrangements of signs and the list
of impossible arrangements. ... the rule of the majority may very well lead
to a forbidden arrangement” [10 ].
1.3 Condorcet’s paradox is closely related to the celebrated impossibility
theorem formulated in 1950–63 by Kenneth J. Arrow [1, 9 ]. This theorem
is concerned with preferences expressed by means of complete rankings, ties
allowed, and with rules for (deterministically) aggregating any given set of in-
dividual preferences of this form into a collective one of the same form. Quite
naturally, one would be interested in rules that comply with the following con-
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ditions: (i) Anonymity: all individuals play the same role; (ii) Respect for
unanimity: if every individual strictly prefers x to y , then the collective rank-
ing strictly prefers also x to y ; (iii) Independence of irrelevant alternatives:
the collective preference about two alternatives x and y depends only on the
individual preferences about x and y . According to Arrow’s theorem, such
a rule does not exist, except in the case where there are only two alternatives.
The doctrinal paradox has motivated the question of extending Arrow’s
theorem to the general problem of constrained judgment aggregation. Anal-
ogously to the preceding paragraph, one would be interested in rules that,
besides keeping consistency with the doctrine in question, comply also with
the following conditions: (i) Anonymity; (ii) Respect for unanimity: if a
particular proposition is accepted by every individual, then it is also ac-
cepted by the collective judgment; (iii) Issue-by-issue aggregation (or inde-
pendence): the collective judgment about each issue depends only on the
individual judgments about it. In the present context, the possibility or im-
possibility of a rule satisfying these conditions clearly depends on the struc-
ture of the doctrine under consideration. For instance, the majority rule will
always do for an empty doctrine, i. e. several propositions without any logical
connection between them. Accordingly, the existing impossibility results, for
which we refer to [21, 22, 7, 17, 8 ], specify certain conditions to be met by
the doctrine.
1.4 In practice, one is bound to make decisions, even for doctrines that
are included in the above-mentioned impossibility results. The purpose of
this article is to put forward a general rule for making such decisions in
consistency with the doctrine. This rule will not comply with the property
of issue-by-issue aggregation. However, it will be anonymous and it will
respect unanimity about any particular issue whenever the individual beliefs
are consistent with the doctrine.
The proposed method generalizes two other ones that are already known
in certain particular areas: In fact, when the doctrine corresponds to the
notion of an equivalence relation on a certain set of items, then one of the
variants of our method yields the so-called single-link method of cluster anal-
ysis [13 ]. On the other hand, when the doctrine corresponds to the notion of
a total order, then the proposed method corresponds essentially to the one
that was introduced in 1997 by Markus Schulze [24 , 25 ; 27 : p. 228–232; 4 , 5 ].
The problem considered in this article should be distinguished from a
related but different one that is often referred to as ‘belief revision’. This
subject is reviewed for instance in [11 ]. In contrast to the present work, where
the doctrine remains fixed, there one allows for the possibility of revising it.
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The remainder of this article is organized in five more sections: 2: Setting
up the problem. 3: Construction and main results. 4: Technical issues and
supplementary topics. 5: Application to specific domains. 6: Discussion and
interpretation of the results.
2 Setting up the problem
In this section we introduce in more detail the objects that we will be deal-
ing with. We will be definitely based upon propositional logic. However,
instead of dealing with all-or-none truth assignments, we will deal with de-
grees of belief in the whole range from 0 to 1. The term ‘belief’ should
be understood here in a very wide sense; depending on the context, it may
be more appropriate to use other terms, such as ‘plausibility’, ‘certainty’,
‘evidence’, et cetera. On the other hand, we will also deal with decision
values within a set of three alternatives meaning respectively ‘accepted’,
‘rejected’ and ‘undecided’. Allowing for undecidedness is unavoidable as
soon as one looks at aggregating different views on the same issues. Besides,
the notion of aggregation also calls for allowing the degree of belief of a nega-
tion p to be independent from that of p . This leads to viewing p and p as
antagonistic to each other but not necessarily mutually exclusive.
2.1 To begin with, we are interested in a finite set of basic propositions
p, q, r, ... together with their respective negations p, q, r, ... . Following the
standard terminology of logic, we will refer to p, q, r, ... as atoms , and an
atom or its negation will be called a literal . The set of atoms will be denoted
as Π+ , and the set of literals will be denoted as Π . So, Π = ∪p∈Π+ {p, p} .
A truth assignment is a mapping whereby each literal is assigned one of
the values ‘true’ or ‘false’, with the restriction that p is false [resp. true]
whenever p is true [resp. false].
We will also deal with compound propositions. They are represented by
formulas that combine atoms by means of the Boolean operators of propo-
sitional calculus, such as ¬,∧,∨,→ and ↔ . We are assuming that ¬p = p
and ¬(p) = p for any p ∈ Π+ . The notions of entailment —or logical
implication— and logical equivalence between formulas will be under-
stood exactly as in classical bivalent propositional logic: One formula entails
another if there is no truth assignment that makes the first one true and
the second one false according to the rules of propositional calculus. Two
formulas are logically equivalent to each other when their truth value is the
same for any truth assignment.
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A doctrine can be seen as a compound proposition —in other words,
a formula— whose truth is assumed to hold. A truth assignment that makes
this formula true will be said to be consistent with the doctrine.
In dealing with the doctrine, we will make a crucial use of the well-known
fact that any formula can be transformed into logically equivalent ones of
the form
Φ(D) :=
∧
C∈D
( ∨
p∈C
p
)
, (1)
where D stands for a collection of subsets of Π . A formula of this form is
called a conjunctive normal form , and the expressions within parentheses
are called its clauses . Generally speaking, a clause means any formula of
the form
φ(C) :=
∨
p∈C
p, (2)
where C is a subset of Π . Obviously, specifying a clause is equivalent to
specifying the associated set C ⊂ Π , and specifying a conjunctive normal
form is equivalent to specifying the associated collection D of subsets of Π .
Because of that, in the following we will sometimes refer to the sets C ∈ D
themselves as ‘clauses’ and we may even refer to the collection D as the
‘doctrine’.
A conjunctive normal form being true means that each of its clauses is
true. On the other hand, a clause being true means that at least one of
its literals is true; in other words, if all of its literals but one are known
to be false, then the remaining one must be true. Therefore, the doctrine
associated with (1) provides the following implications:
p ←
∧
α∈C
α 6=p
α, (3)
for any C ∈ D such that p ∈ C . The method developed below will be based
crucially on such implications.
The conjunctive normal forms equivalent to a given doctrine are by no
means unique. Later on, we will restrict ourselves to the special class of
prime conjunctive normal forms , and eventually we will choose a par-
ticular member of that class which is known as the Blake canonical form.
These concepts will be introduced in § 4.1.
On the other hand, we adopt from now on the following assumptions:
(D1) The doctrine is satisfiable and it is given in conjunctive normal form.
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(D2) It does not contain unit clauses, i. e. clauses with a single literal.
Otherwise, one can always fix it by replacing such literals and their
negations by the corresponding truth values, and deleting them
from Π .
(D3) It explicitly contains each of the tertium non datur clauses p ∨ p ,
with p ∈ Π+ . This special convention provides the trivial implica-
tions p← p for any p ∈ Π .
2.2 We call valuation any mapping w whereby each literal p in Π is
assigned a value wp in the interval of real numbers from 0 to 1. The num-
ber wp , sometimes denoted alternatively as w(p), will be seen as a degree of
belief in the proposition p .
Generally speaking, the values of wp and wp need not add up to 1,
but their sum can take any value from 0 to 2. Having wp + wp < 1 means
a lack of information, whereas wp+wp > 1 means that some contradiction is
present. A valuation that satisfies wp +wp = 1 for any p ∈ Π will be called
balanced .
Later on, we will sometimes compare two valuations v and w . In that
connection, v ≤ w will mean simply that vp ≤ wp for any p ∈ Π .
The truth assignments of classical propositional logic can be seen as bal-
anced valuations that take only the values 0 and 1, where 1 means ‘true’
and 0 means ‘false’. Since they are formally the same, in the sequel we will
often identify truth assignments with balanced all-or-none beliefs.
We will also be interested in balanced valuations with values in {0, 1
2
, 1} ,
where the value 1
2
can be interpreted as ‘undefined’ or ‘undecided’. We will
refer to such valuations as partial truth assignments , a term that we
are taking from satisfiability theory. They will be used mainly for specifying
decisions, in which case the values 1, 0 and 1
2
can be interpreted as meaning
respectively ‘accepted’, ‘rejected’ and ‘undecided’.
A partial truth assignment u will be said to be definitely consistent
with D , or with Φ(D), when, for each clause C ∈ D and every p ∈ C ,
the following implication holds: if uα = 0 for every α ∈ C\{p} , then up = 1.
When no undecidedness is present, a partial truth assignment being definitely
consistent is equivalent to its being consistent as a truth assignment. When
undecidedness is allowed, definite consistency requires every clause to contain
at least one accepted literal, or alternatively, at least two undecided literals.
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Every valuation w gives rise to a (partial) decision in the following way,
that depends on a parameter η in the interval 0 ≤ η ≤ 1: For any p ∈ Π ,
p is accepted and p is rejected whenever wp − wp > η, (4)
p and p are left undecided whenever |wp − wp | ≤ η. (5)
We will refer to it as the decision of margin η associated with w , and we
will identify it with the corresponding partial truth assignment, which will
be denoted as µη(w). In the case η = 0 we will call it the basic decision
associated with w , and the corresponding partial truth assignment will be
denoted as µ(w). In tune with these definitions, the difference wp−wp will
be called the acceptability of p according to w . If the valuation w is
balanced, then the basic decision criterion is equivalent to the majority rule
of §1.2, namely accepting p and rejecting p whenever wp > 12 .
2.3 Valuations are often an aggregate of several components (members of
a jury, decision criteria, etc.), i. e. an average of the form
vp =
∑
k
ak v
k
p , (6)
where vk are the component valuations, and ak are the corresponding relative
frequencies or weights, satisfying ak ≥ 0 for any k and
∑
k ak = 1. If the
component valuations have an all-or-none character, then vp is the fraction
of components where p is considered valid.
The doctrinal paradox points out the possibility that the average valua-
tion be not consistent with the doctrine even when all component valuations
are consistent with it.
2.4 Our main aim can be stated in the following way: Given a valuation v ,
build a revised one that achieves consistency with the doctrine while staying
as near as possible to v .
In the method presented below, the consistency of the revised valuation
will hold in a general sense that entails the definite consistency of the asso-
ciated decisions in the sense of the definition given in § 2.2.
Generally speaking, we will obtain two revised valuations v∗ and ∗v
satisfying the inequalities ∗v ≤ v ≤ v∗ . We will call them respectively
the upper and lower revised valuations. For a balanced original valuation,
the upper and lower revised valuations give rise to exactly the same decision.
However, in the unbalanced case they can lead to different decisions.
For the moment, we will be concerned only with the upper revised valu-
ation v∗ , the lower one being introduced at the end by duality.
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3 Construction and main results
3.1 Construction. The upper revised valuation will be obtained by means
of an iterative process whereby belief will be propagated along the impli-
cations contained in the doctrine. More specifically, we will consider the
implications (3) and we will apply the following general principle:
(P) Consider an implication of the form p ← ∧α∈Σ α with Σ ⊂ Π .
As soon as the right-hand side is satisfiable, this implication gives
to p at least the same degree of belief as the weakest of the con-
juncts α .
The hypothesis of satisfiability contained in this principle should be un-
derstood in relation to the doctrine under consideration: Among the truth
assignments that make the doctrine true, at least one of them should make
the conjunction
∧
α∈Σ α true. Unless otherwise stated, in the sequel ‘sat-
isfiability’ should always be understood in this sense. In § 4.1 we will see
that this amounts to requiring the conjunctive normal form that expresses
the doctrine to be a prime conjunctive normal form. However, for the mo-
ment we need not be concerned with this question. In fact, principle (P)
will be used only to motivate certain definitions that can be applied to any
conjunctive normal form.
In contrast, the present subsection already makes use of the assumptions
(D1, D2, D3) adopted at the end of § 2.1.
Let us look at the consequences of applying principle (P) to the implica-
tions (3). Starting with the degrees of belief given by v , we infer that every
p ∈ Π should be believed at least in the degree v′p defined by
v′p = max
C∈D
C3p
min
α∈C
α 6=p
vα, (7)
where the max and min operators are ensured to deal with non-empty sets
of values as a consequence of assumptions (D2) and (D3).
Lemma 3.1. The transformation v 7→ v′ has the following properties:
(a) It is continuous.
(b) v ≤ w implies v′ ≤ w′ .
(c) v ≤ v′ .
(d) The image set of v′ is contained in that of v .
Proof. Part (a): Since max and min are continuous. Part (b): Since max
and min are monotone. Part (c): Because of the tertium non datur clauses
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provided by (D3), one of the arguments of the max operator in the right-
hand side of (7) is vp . Part (d): Formula (7) entails that v
′
p coincides with
vα for some α ∈ Π .
As soon as we accept v′ as new degrees of belief, it makes sense to repeat
the same operation with v replaced by v′ , thus obtaining a still higher valu-
ation v′′ , and so on. By proceeding in this way, one obtains a non-decreasing
sequence of valuations v(n) (n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ) with the property that all of
them take values in the same finite set, namely { vα | α ∈ Π } . Obviously,
this implies that this sequence will eventually reach an invariant state v∗ .
This eventual valuation is, by definition, the upper revised valuation .
Theorem 3.2. The transformation v 7→ v∗ has the following properties:
(a) It is continuous.
(b) v ≤ w implies v∗ ≤ w∗ .
(c) v ≤ v∗ .
(d) The image set of v∗ is contained in that of v .
Proof. Everything is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.1.
Theorem 3.3. The upper revised valuation v∗ is the lowest of the valuations
w that lie above v and satisfy the equation w′ = w .
Proof. Theorem 3.2 ensures that v∗ satisfies the inequality v ≤ v∗ . Besides,
its being invariant by the transformation w 7→ w′ means that it satisfies the
equality v∗′ = v∗ . It remains to see that v ≤ w together with w′ = w
implies v∗ ≤ w . To this effect, it suffices to use Theorem 3.2.b to see that
the inequality v ≤ w entails v∗ ≤ w∗ , and to combine this inequality with
the equality w∗ = w , which follows from w′ = w by the definition of w∗ .
3.2 Consistency. Let us look at the meaning of satisfying the equation
w′ = w . Since the inequality w′ ≥ w is always satisfied —because of the
tertium non datur clauses, as it was seen in Lemma 3.1.c— satisfying that
equation is equivalent to satisfying the inequality w ≥ w′ , i. e. having
wp ≥ min
α∈C
α6=p
wα, ∀p ∈ Π and ∀C ∈ D with p ∈ C . (8)
This is saying that the valuation w is consistent with principle (P) in connec-
tion with all the implications of the form (3) contained in the doctrine. This
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motivates the following definition: A valuation w is consistent with the
doctrine D if and only if it satisfies the equation w′ = w , where w′ means
the image of w by the transformation defined by (7). As we have just re-
marked, this is equivalent to requiring that w satisfies the inequalities (8).
The following results show that this notion of consistency for a general
valuation w agrees with the standard notion of consistency of a truth assign-
ment —namely that the Boolean formula (1) evaluates to true— and it is
stronger than the notion of definite consistency of a decision that we defined
in § 2.2.
Proposition 3.4. A truth assignment is consistent with the doctrine if and
only if the corresponding all-or-none valuation u satisfies the equality u′ = u.
Proof. Let Φ be the conjunctive normal form that expresses the doctrine.
Let us begin by seeing that the consistency of the truth assignment implies
u′p = up for any p ∈ Π . When up = 1, this is true because of parts (c) and
(d) of Lemma 3.1. When up = 0, the truth of Φ requires that any clause C
that contains p must contain also some α 6= p with uα = 1 and therefore
uα = 0. By introducing this in (7) one gets u
′
p = 0.
Let us see now that the truth assignment not being consistent implies
u′ 6= u . The lack of consistency of the truth assignment means that there
exists at least one clause C that is not satisfied, i. e. such that up = 0 for any
p ∈ C . By taking one such p and noticing that uα = 1 for any α ∈ C \ {p}
—that exists because of (D2)— one gets u′p = 1 > 0 = up .
Proposition 3.5. Let u be a partial truth assignment. If the equality u′ = u
is satisfied, then u is definitely consistent with the doctrine.
Proof. In accordance with the definition of definite consistency given in
§ 2.2, we have to check that for each C ∈ D and every p ∈ C , having uα = 1
for all α ∈ C \ {p} implies up = 1. To this effect, it suffices to use the
definition of u′ , which gives u′p = 1, plus the assumed equality up = u
′
p .
Remark. The converse is not true: In fact, for a clause p∨q∨r the definition
of definite consistency allows for having up = 0 and uq = ur =
1
2
, in which
case one gets u′p =
1
2
6= up . Having said that, one easily sees that u being
definitely consistent implies µ(u′) = u .
The following is one of the fundamental results of this article:
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Theorem 3.6. A valuation w being consistent, i. e. satisfying the equality
w′ = w , entails the definite consistency of the associated decision of margin η
—that is the partial truth assignment µη(w)— for any η in the interval
0 ≤ η ≤ 1.
Proof. Recall that the consistency of w is equivalent to its satisfying the
inequalities (8). In accordance with the definition of definite consistency, we
must show that for each C ∈ D and every p ∈ C , if all α ∈ C \ {p} are
rejected for the decision of margin η associated with w , then p is accepted
for this decision. Assume the contrary: p is not accepted, that is
wp ≥ wp − η. (9)
From (8) it follows that
wp ≥ min
α∈C
α 6=p
wα = wq, (10)
for some q ∈ C \ {p} . Let us fix such a q . By combining (9) and (10) we get
wp ≥ wq − η. (11)
Now, since q 6= p , the hypothesis that q is rejected is saying that
wq − η > wq. (12)
On the other hand, (8) entails that
wq ≥ min
α∈C
α 6=q
wα = min
(
wp , min
α∈C
α 6∈{p,q}
wα
)
, (13)
from which (11) and (10) —and the hypothesis that η ≥ 0— allow to con-
clude that
wq ≥ wq − η, (14)
in contradiction with (12).
Corollary 3.7. For any η in the interval 0≤ η≤ 1, the decision of mar-
gin η associated with the upper revised valuation v∗ —that is the partial truth
assignment µη(v
∗)— is always definitely consistent.
Proof. It is simply a matter of recalling that v∗ satisfies the hypothesis of
the preceding theorem.
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3.3 Respect for consistent majority decisions and respect for una-
nimity. A very natural property to ask for is the following: If the majority
criterion applied to the original valuation v decides on each issue and is con-
sistent with the doctrine, then this decision should hold. This property of
respect for consistent majority decisions will be obtained as a conse-
quence of the following fact:
Proposition 3.8. For any valuation v , and any consistent truth assign-
ment u, one has
max
up=1
v∗p ≤ max
uq=1
vq. (15)
Proof. Since v∗ is obtained by iterating the transformation v 7→ v′ , it suf-
fices to show that this transformation has the following property analogous
to (15): v′p ≤ maxuq=1 vq whenever up = 1. This follows immediately
from (7) because the consistency of u requires every clause C that contains
p with up = 1 to contain also some q with uq = 1, which ensures that
minα∈C,α6=p vα ≤ maxuq=1 vq .
The property of respect for consistent majority decisions corresponds to the
case θ ≥ 1
2
≥ θ − η of the following more general result:
Theorem 3.9. Assume that there exist θ ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ [0, 1) such
that every p ∈ Π satisfies either vp > θ ≥ θ − η > vp or, contrarily,
vp > θ ≥ θ − η > vp . If the decision associated with v (which contains
no undecidedness and has a margin η) is consistent with the doctrine, then
it agrees with the decision of margin η associated with the upper revised
valuation v∗ .
Proof. Let u be the truth assignment that corresponds to the decision as-
sociated with v , that is:
up =
{
1, if vp > θ ≥ θ − η > vp;
0, if vp > θ ≥ θ − η > vp.
(16)
From this definition it follows that
min
up=1
vp − max
up=1
vp > η. (17)
By combining this inequality with (15), which holds because of the consis-
tency of u , and part (c) of Theorem 3.2, it follows that
min
up=1
v∗p − max
up=1
v∗p > η, (18)
which implies v∗p − v∗p > η whenever up = 1.
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Remark. When v is balanced, the condition vp >
1
2
> vp is equivalent to
requiring simply that vp > vp . Generally speaking, however, the latter con-
dition cannot be substituted for the former in the preceding result.
According to part (c) of Theorem 3.2, vp = 1 implies v
∗
p = 1. The follow-
ing result shows that the converse implication holds when v is an aggregate
of definitely consistent partial truth assignments. By an aggregate we mean
a convex combination of several components vk , as in (6).
Proposition 3.10. Assume that v is an aggregate of definitely consistent
partial truth assignments. In this case, having v∗p = 1 implies vp = 1.
Proof. We will proceed by induction on the iterates v(n) . More specifically,
we aim at showing that
for any p ∈ Π , the equality v(n)p = 1 implies vp = 1, (19n)
where we emphasize that the statement includes the quantifier “for any p∈Π ”.
For n = 0 this is trivially true since v(0) = v . For n ≥ 1, (19n ) can be
obtained from (19n−1 ) in the following way: Let us assume that v
(n)
p = 1.
If v
(n−1)
p = 1, the conclusion follows directly from (19n−1 ). Otherwise, the in-
equality 1 = v
(n)
p > v
(n−1)
p entails the existence of a proper clause C , i. e. a
clause different from the ones associated with the tertium non datur principle,
such that v
(n−1)
α = 1 for any α ∈ C \{p} . Now, (19n−1 ) ensures that vα = 1.
Notice that this implies v′p = 1, which entails vp = 1 once (191 ) is estab-
lished; however, establishing (19n ) for any n ≥ 1 requires making use of the
fact that v has the form (6), where the vk are definitely consistent partial
truth assignments. Since ak ≥ 0 and
∑
k ak = 1, it is clear that the equality
vα = 1 entails v
k
α = 1 whenever ak > 0, i. e. for any k that matters. Now,
since partial truth assignments are balanced, it follows that vkα = 0. On the
other hand, since the vk are definitely consistent with the doctrine, and the
preceding conclusion is valid for any α ∈ C \ {p} , it follows that vkp = 1.
Finally, this certainly implies vp = 1.
An important consequence of the preceding result is the following property
of respect for unanimity:
Theorem 3.11. Assume that v is an aggregate of definitely consistent par-
tial truth assignments. In this case, having vp = 1 implies that p is accepted
by the basic decision associated with the upper revised valuation v∗ .
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Proof. We must show that v∗p > v
∗
p . In the present case we know that
v∗p = 1, so that the proof reduces to showing that v
∗
p < 1. This inequality
is easily obtained by contradiction. In fact, according to Proposition 3.10,
v∗p = 1 would imply vp = 1, that is incompatible with vp = 1 because
vp + vp = 1, which derives from the analogous equality satisfied by the
components vk .
3.4 Monotonicity. In this subsection we look at the effect of raising the
original value of a particular literal p without any change in the others.
We aim at showing that in these circumstances the acceptability of p either
increases or stays constant.
Lemma 3.12. Consider the dependence of v∗q on vp when vα is kept con-
stant for all α 6= p. For any q ∈ Π , this dependence has the following form:
there exist a and b with 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 such that
v∗q =

a, for 0 ≤ vp ≤ a,
vp, for a ≤ vp ≤ b,
b, for b ≤ vp ≤ 1.
(20)
Proof. According to part (d) Theorem 3.2, the graph of v∗q as a function
of vp is contained in the union of the horizontal lines v
∗
q = vα (α ∈ Π \ {p})
together with the diagonal one v∗q = vp . On the other hand, part (a) of that
theorem ensures that the function vp 7→ v∗q is continuous. These constraints
leave no other possibility than the pattern (20).
In order to analyse the effect of raising the value of vp we will use the
following notation and terminology: v˜ denotes a modified valuation that
differs from v only in that v˜p > vp . The objects associated with v˜ will be
referred to by means of a tilde. For any magnitude u that depends on vp ,
the statement “u stays constant ” means that there exists δ > 0 such
that for any v˜p in the interval vp ≤ v˜p ≤ vp + δ one has u˜ = u ; similarly,
the statement “u increases ” means that there exists δ > 0 such that
for any v˜p in the interval vp < v˜p ≤ vp + δ one has u˜ > u . Notice that these
definitions consider only values of v˜p at the right of vp .
Lemma 3.13. Let us allow vp to grow while vα is kept constant for α 6= p.
If there exists q ∈ Π such that v∗q increases, then v∗p = vp .
Proof. We will proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that v∗p 6= vp .
According to part (c) of Theorem 3.2, it must be v∗p > vp . This allows to
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choose v˜p so that vp < v˜p < v
∗
p . The hypothesis that v
∗
q increases ensures
that v∗q < v˜
∗
q (this is true not only for v˜p in a neighbourhood at the right
of vp , but also for any v˜p > vp , since part (b) of Theorem 3.2 ensures that
v˜∗q is a non-decreasing function of vp ). Let us consider now the valuation
w that coincides with v for all literals except possibly p , for which we set
wp = v
∗
p . Since v˜p < v
∗
p , part (b) of Theorem 3.2 ensures that v˜
∗
q ≤ w∗q . We
will arrive at contradiction by showing that w∗q = v
∗
q . In fact, by combining
this equality with some of the preceding inequalities, namely v∗q < v˜
∗
q ≤ w∗q ,
one would arrive at the false conclusion that v∗q < v
∗
q .
The claim that w∗q = v
∗
q is again a consequence of part (b) of Theorem 3.2:
Since v ≤ w ≤ v∗ , that result ensures that v∗ ≤ w∗ ≤ v∗∗ . On the other
hand, the invariance of v∗ by the transformation u 7→ u′ entails v∗∗ = v∗ .
Theorem 3.14. Let us allow vp to grow while vα is kept constant for α 6= p.
In these circumstances, the acceptability of p, that is the difference v∗p − v∗p ,
either increases or stays constant.
Proof. By part (b) of Theorem 3.2, v∗p and v
∗
p have the property that each
of them either increases or stays constant. When v∗p stays constant we are
done. Now, when v∗p increases, Lemma 3.13 ensures that v
∗
p = vp . Since
v˜∗p ≥ v˜p > vp , it follows that v∗p increases too. However, according to
Lemma 3.12 the only possible way for both v∗p and v
∗
p to increase is by
having v˜∗p = v˜
∗
p = v˜p for any v˜p in an interval of the form vp ≤ v˜p ≤ vp + δ
with δ > 0, which entails that v∗p−v∗p stays constant (and equal to zero).
Corollary 3.15. Assume that the valuation v is modified into a new one
v˜ such that
v˜p > vp, v˜q = vq, ∀q ∈ Π \ {p}, (21)
and let η be any number in the interval 0 ≤ η ≤ 1. If p is accepted [resp. not
rejected ] in the decision of margin η associated with v∗ , then it is also ac-
cepted [resp. not rejected ] in the decision of margin η associated with v˜∗ .
4 Technical issues and supplementary topics
4.1 Which conjunctive normal form? In this subsection we look at the
effect of the conjunctive normal form Φ that expresses the doctrine. In this
connection, we will be led to make a particular choice, namely the so-called
Blake canonical form.
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In the following Φ˜ stands for an alternative conjunctive normal form
(with literals in the same set Π ) and we systematically use a tilde to denote
the objects associated with Φ˜ . In particular, v∗ and v˜∗ mean the upper
revised valuations obtained from a given v by using respectively Φ and Φ˜ .
For the moment, Φ and Φ˜ need not be logically equivalent to each other.
If one has v∗ = v˜∗ for any v we will say that Φ and Φ˜ are ∗-equivalent.
Proposition 4.1. ∗-Equivalence implies logical equivalence.
Proof. Φ and Φ˜ not being logically equivalent means that there exists a
truth assignment u that makes one of them, say Φ, true, and the other, Φ˜ ,
false. According to Proposition 3.4, this entails that u∗ = u but u˜∗ 6= u ,
so that Φ and Φ˜ are not ∗-equivalent.
However, logical equivalence does not imply ∗-equivalence. As a simple ex-
ample, we can take Φ = (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ q ∨ r) and Φ˜ = p ∨ q , for which one
easily checks that v˜∗r = vr < v
∗
r as soon as vr < min(vp, vq). The following
result can be seen as a generalization of what happens in this example.
Proposition 4.2. If all clauses of Φ˜ are present also in Φ, i. e. D˜ ⊆ D,
then v˜∗ ≤ v∗ .
Proof. We will proceed by induction along the iteration that eventually
gives the upper revised valuation v∗ . As in § 3.1, we denote the iterates
by v(n) . We aim at showing that v˜(n) ≤ v(n) for any n ≥ 0. For n = 0 this
is satisfied as an equality, since we are starting from the same valuation v .
In order to go from n− 1 to n , it suffices to compare v˜(n) and v(n) through
the valuation w defined by
wp = max
C∈D
C3p
min
α∈C
α 6=p
v˜
(n−1)
α , (22)
(with a tilde in v˜(n−1) , but not in D). In fact, on the one hand, by comparing
the preceding expression with the one that defines v˜(n) in terms of v˜(n−1) ,
one easily sees that v˜(n) ≤ w , since more clauses entail a higher maximum.
On the other hand, Lemma 3.1.b allows to derive the inequality w ≤ v(n)
from the hypothesis that v˜(n−1) ≤ v(n−1) .
Let us look at the meaning of the hypothesis contained in principle (P),
namely the satisfiability (within the doctrine under consideration) of the con-
junction
∧
α∈Σ α that implies p . Not requiring this satisfiability would lead
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to such non-senses as giving a certain degree of belief to any p just because of
the tautological but ‘improper’ implication p← (q ∧ q) (for an arbitrary q ).
Now, the conjunction that appears in (3) is
∧
α∈C,α6=p α , whose not being sat-
isfiable is equivalent to
∨
α∈C,α6=p α being always satisfied, in which case the
clause
∨
α∈C α could have been replaced by the stronger one
∨
α∈C,α6=p α .
So, the hypothesis that the right-hand side of (3) is satisfiable whenever
p ∈ C ∈ D amounts to say that every clause has the property that the
corresponding set C ∈ D has no proper subset C ′ with φ(C ′) = ∨α∈C′ α
already entailed by the doctrine. In other words, every clause should be a
prime implicate of the doctrine under consideration. In [7, 17, 8 ] one uses
the equivalent terminology of saying that C = {α | α ∈ C } is a ‘minimal
inconsistent set’, whereas in [21, 22 ] C is said to be a ‘critical family’. From
now on we add the following assumption to those adopted in § 2.1:
(D4) The conjunctive normal form that expresses the doctrine is made of
prime implicates.
Such conjunctive normal forms will be referred to as prime conjunctive
normal forms . As we have seen at the beginning of this paragraph, they
are the only ones that propagate belief in a proper way, without making it
up.
Among all the prime conjunctive normal forms equivalent to a given doc-
trine, we will take as a natural choice the Blake canonical form , so called
after Archie Blake, who introduced it in 1937 [2 ]. Given a formula f , the
Blake canonical form of f is the conjunctive normal form which is made of all
the prime implicates of f . The following statement gives its main property
in connection with the upper revised valuation v∗ :
Proposition 4.3. Among all the prime conjunctive normal forms logically
equivalent to a given doctrine, the Blake canonical form has the property of
giving the greatest possible upper revised valuation.
Proof. It follows immediately from the definitions by virtue of Proposi-
tion 4.2.
The next theorem gives a systematic method for obtaining the Blake
canonical form of a formula f . The procedure will start from any conjunctive
normal form Φ˜ logically equivalent to f —which is quite easy to obtain—
and it will apply repeatedly the two following operations, where φ, ψ stand
for generic disjunctions of literals:
Absorption: replacing φ ∧ (φ ∨ ψ) by φ .
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Resolution: replacing (φ ∨ p) ∧ (ψ ∨ p) by (φ ∨ p) ∧ (ψ ∨ p) ∧ (φ ∨ ψ)
under the proviso that φ and ψ do not contain respectively a literal
and its negation, and that φ∨ ψ is not absorbed by a clause already
present.
In the dual context of disjunctive normal forms, the operations analogous to
resolution and absorption are known respectively as consensus and subsump-
tion.
Theorem 4.4 (Blake, 1937; Samson, Mills, 1954; Quine, 1955–59; see [3, 18 ]).
In order to obtain the Blake canonical form of a formula f it suffices to take
any conjunctive normal form Φ˜ logically equivalent to f and to transform
it by applying repeatedly the operations of absorption and resolution until no
further application is possible (which happens after a finite number of steps).
Remarks
1. In order to check a given conjunctive normal form Φ˜ for its being
prime, it is a matter of deriving the Blake canonical form Φ by following the
procedure of absorption and resolution and checking whether Φ contains all
the clauses of Φ˜ ; in other words, checking that none of the original clauses
disappears by absorption in the process.
2. According to the special convention (D3) adopted at the end of § 2.1,
we systematically supplement the Blake canonical form with all the tertium
non datur clauses (which are neutral elements for the operation of resolution,
and are prime under the assumption (D2) of absence of unit clauses). Under
this convention, in the definition of the operation of resolution one can drop
the proviso that φ and ψ must not contain respectively a literal and its
negation; in fact, in this case φ∨ψ is absorbed by one the tertium non datur
clauses. The context will always make clear whether we mean the standard
Blake canonical one or the supplemented one.
4.2 Disjoint resolution. In some cases the Blake canonical form can
be quite long. In fact, it is well known that generally speaking its length
can grow exponentially in the number of variables. This raises the question
whether there are shorter prime conjunctive normal forms ∗-equivalent to it.
Generally speaking, it need not be so. A simple example is the conjunctive
normal form Φ˜ = (p ∨ q ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ r ∨ s), for which one can easily check
that the Blake canonical form is Φ = (p ∨ q ∨ r) ∧ (p ∨ r ∨ s) ∧ (p ∨ q ∨ s),
and that v∗p > v˜
∗
p as soon as min(vq, vs) > max(vr, vr). Having said that,
the next results identify certain situations where shorter conjunctive normal
forms can be shown to be ∗-equivalent to the Blake canonical form. In this
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connection, we will use the following terminology: A disjoint resolution
means a resolution operation as above but with φ and ψ having no literals
in common. A conjunctive normal form will be called disjoint-resolvable
when a suitable choice of which clauses to resolve at every stage allows to
arrive at the Blake canonical form by only making use of disjoint resolution
and absorption.
Proposition 4.5. Let Φ and Φ˜ be conjunctive normal forms. If Φ is
obtained from Φ˜ by a single disjoint resolution operation, then v∗ = v˜∗ .
Proof. Clearly, D˜ ⊆ D . So Proposition 4.2 ensures that v˜∗ ≤ v∗ . In order
to prove the equality we will make use of the characterization of v∗ given by
Theorem 3.3: v∗ is the lowest valuation w that satisfies w′ = w ≥ v . So,
we will be done if we show that the latter conditions are satisfied when we
put w = v˜∗ . From now on we fix w to mean v˜∗ . What we know is that
w˜ ′ = w ≥ v , where in principle w˜ ′ differs from w′ in that they use different
conjunctive normal forms. So the problem reduces to showing that w′ = w˜ ′ .
Now, the two conjunctive normal forms in consideration differ only in
that D = D˜ ∪ {C∗} , where C∗ = (C˜1 \ {q}) ∪ (C˜2 \ {q}) with C˜1, C˜2 ∈ D˜
containing respectively q and q . Clearly, w′p cannot differ from w˜
′
p except
for p ∈ C∗ , in which case we have
w′p = max
(
w˜ ′p , min
α∈C∗
α 6=p
wα
)
. (23)
So we should show that
min
α∈C∗
α6=p
wα ≤ w˜ ′p, ∀p ∈ C∗. (24)
The hypothesis of disjoint resolution means that either p ∈ C˜1 \ {q} or
p ∈ C˜2 \ {q} , but not both. The two cases are analogous to each other,
so we will consider only the second one. In order to obtain (24) we begin by
noticing that
min
α∈C∗
α 6=p
wα = min
(
min
α∈C˜1
α 6=q
α 6=p
wα , min
α∈C˜2
α 6=q
α 6=p
wα
)
. (25)
Now, since we are assuming p /∈ C˜1 , we have
min
α∈C˜1
α6=q
α6=p
wα = min
α∈C˜1
α 6=q
wα ≤ w˜ ′q = wq, (26)
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where we used that w˜ ′ = w . Finally, by plugging (26) into (25) we get
min
α∈C∗
α 6=p
wα ≤ min
(
wq , min
α∈C˜2
α 6=q
α 6=p
wα
)
= min
α∈C˜2
α 6=p
wα ≤ w˜ ′p, (27)
as desired.
Corollary 4.6. Any disjoint-resolvable prime conjunctive normal form is
∗-equivalent to the Blake canonical form.
Proof. Let Φ and Φ˜ denote respectively the Blake canonical form and a
disjoint-resolvable prime conjunctive normal form. Since we can go from Φ˜
to Φ via disjoint resolution and absorption, Propositions 4.5 and 4.2 ensure
that v∗ ≤ v˜∗ . On the other hand, the reverse inequality is guaranteed by
Proposition 4.3, since the disjoint resolvability of Φ˜ certainly ensures that
Φ˜ is logically equivalent to Φ.
Related to the preceding results, one can see that disjoint resolvability
ensures not only ∗-equivalence, but also equivalence with respect to the
property of definite consistency of a partial truth assignment:
Proposition 4.7. A partial truth assignment is definitely consistent for
a disjoint-resolvable conjunctive normal form if and only if it is definitely
consistent for the corresponding Blake canonical form.
Proof. Let Φ and Φ˜ denote respectively the Blake canonical form and a
disjoint-resolvable conjunctive normal form. The claim that definite consis-
tency with Φ˜ implies definite consistency with Φ follows from the easily
checked fact that definite consistency is preserved by the operations of ab-
sorption and disjoint resolution. The converse implication is a simple con-
sequence of the definition of the Blake canonical form, which ensures that
every clause of Φ˜ contains, as a set of literals, some clause of Φ.
Remark. The definition of disjoint resolvability implies going through (a spe-
cial form of) the process of generating the Blake canonical form. On the
other hand, the latter is also required for checking whether a given conjunc-
tive normal form is prime. It would certainly be very interesting to be able
to recognise these properties without having to go through the process of
generating the Blake canonical form.
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4.3 Getting there in a single step. Since the Blake canonical form of
a doctrine contains all of its prime implicates, one might think that this con-
junctive normal form will always lead to v∗ in a single step, that is v∗ = v′ .
Generally speaking, however, it need not be so.
A simple example is the doctrine
(p ∨ q ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ r). (28)
This conjunctive normal form is already the Blake canonical form, since the
two clauses in it are related to each other by a double opposition, which
precludes the operation of resolution. The one-step revision transformation
is as follows:
v′p = max
(
vp,min(vq, vr)
)
, v′p = vp, (29)
v′q = max
(
vq,min(vp, vr)
)
, v′q = max (vq, vr), (30)
v′r = max
(
vr,min(vp, vq)
)
, v′r = max (vr, vq), (31)
Using these equations, one easily checks, for instance, that the valuation
(vp, vq, vr; vp, vq, vr) = (.0, .4, .0; .0, .6, .3) results in (v
′
p, v
′
q, v
′
r; v
′
p, v
′
q, v
′
r) =
(.3, .4, .0; .0, .6, .4) and (v′′p , v
′′
q , v
′′
r ; v
′′
p , v
′′
q , v
′′
r ) = (.4, .4, .0; .0, .6, .4), where v
′′
p
is strictly larger than v′p .
A doctrine whose Blake canonical form does not satisfy v∗ = v′ may raise
suspicion. This is indeed the case of the doctrine (28). Let us see why. By
composing the transformation (29–31) with itself one gets
v′′p = max
(
vp,min(vq, vr),min(vq, vq),min(vr, vr),min(vr, vq)
)
. (32)
Now, for the numerical values given after (29–31), the maximum of the right-
hand side of (32) is achieved by the term min(vq, vq). This is quite embar-
rasing, since it corresponds to deriving belief about p from the unsatisfiable
conjunction q ∧ q , which goes against the proviso stipulated in principle (P).
One can argue that (32) is the result of two steps that separately comply with
that condition. However, one cannot but remain somehow unconvinced.
A sufficient condition for having v∗p = v
′
p is provided by the following
result. From now on, we use the notation C ∨
q
C ′ to represent a set of the
form (C \ {q}) ∪ (C ′ \ {q}).
Theorem 4.8. Let us assume that the following condition is satisfied for a
given p ∈ Π :
For any C,C ′ ∈ D and q ∈ Π \ {p} satisfying p, q ∈ C and q ∈ C ′ ,
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one has either (a) or (b) or both of them:
(a) there exists C1 ∈ D such that p ∈ C1 ⊆ C ∨q C ′ ;
(b) v∗p > minα∈C∨
q
C′ \ {p} v
∗
α .
In such a situation one is ensured to have v∗p = v
′
p .
Proof. We will argue by contradiction. More specifically, we will assume
v∗p = v
(n)
p > v
(n−1)
p with n ≥ 2, and we will see that it leads to contradiction.
The formula that defines v
(n)
p allows us to write
v∗p = max
C∈D
C3p
min
α∈C
α 6=p
v
(n−1)
α = min
α∈C0
α 6=p
v
(n−1)
α , (33)
where C0 stands for any clause that realizes the maximum of the middle
expression. In the sequel we will refer to such a clause as a ‘realizer’. For
every realizer C0 it will be useful to consider the following partition of it:
C0 = {p}∪C˙0∪C¨0 , where C˙0 and C¨0 are formed by those literals α ∈ C0\{p}
that satisfy respectively v
(n−2)
α < v
∗
p and v
(n−2)
α ≥ v∗p . By taking into account
that v(n−1) ≥ v(n−2) , one easily checks that
v∗p = min
(
min
α∈C˙0
v
(n−1)
α , min
α∈C¨0
v
(n−2)
α
)
. (34)
For C˙0 = ∅ , the right-hand side of (34) reduces to the expression whose
maximization defines v
(n−1)
p , which gives v∗p ≤ v(n−1)p , in contradiction to
our assumption. Therefore, our aim will be reached if we show that for any
realizer C0 with C˙0 6= ∅ , either the equality (34) leads itself to contradiction,
or there exists another realizer C1 with the property that C˙1 is strictly
contained in C˙0 , which would lead to the empty set in a finite number of
steps.
So, let C0 be a realizer with C˙0 6= ∅ , and let q be any element of C˙0 .
Similarly to (33), we can write
v
(n−1)
q = max
C∈D
C3q
min
α∈C
α 6=q
v
(n−2)
α = min
α∈C′0
α6=q
v
(n−2)
α , (35)
where C ′0 stands for any clause that realizes the maximum of the middle
expression. By introducing (35) in (34), we get
v(n)p = min
(
min
α∈C˙0\{q}
v
(n−1)
α , min
α∈C¨0
v
(n−2)
α , min
α∈C′0
α 6=q
v
(n−2)
α
)
. (36)
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We now apply the hypothesis of the theorem with C = C0 , C
′ = C ′0 :
Either (a) there exists C1 ∈ D such that p ∈ C1 ⊆ C0 ∨q C ′0 , or (b) v∗p >
min
α∈C0∨q C′0 \ {p}
v∗α .
If (b) holds, we arrive to contradiction in the following way:
v(n)p = min
(
min
α∈C0\{q}
α 6=p
v
(n−1)
α , min
α∈C′0
α 6=q
v
(n−2)
α
)
≤ min
α∈C0∨q C′0\{p}
v∗α < v
∗
p, (37)
where we have used the inequalities v(k) ≤ v∗ .
If (a) holds, we can write
v(n)p ≤ min
(
min
α∈C1∩C˙0
v
(n−1)
α , min
α∈C1∩C¨0
v
(n−2)
α , min
α∈C1∩C′0
v
(n−2)
α
)
≤ min
α∈C1
α 6=p
v
(n−1)
α ≤ v(n)p , (38)
where the first inequality derives from (36) because of the inclusion that
relates C1 to C0 and C
′
0 , the second inequality uses simply that v
(n−2) ≤
v(n−1) , and the third one follows from the definition of v(n)p since C1 3 p .
Therefore, the three expressions between inequality signs in (38) are in fact
equal to each other, which entails that C1 is a realizer. On account of the
definition of C˙1 and the equality v
(n)
p = v∗p , the obtained equality entails also
that C˙1 ⊆ C1 ∩ C˙0 ⊂ C˙0 , where the last inclusion is strict since q ∈ C˙0 but
q /∈ C1 . So, C1 is indeed a realizer with C˙1 strictly contained in C˙0 .
Remarks
1. Condition (b) is satisfied whenever one has v∗p > minα∈C\ {p} v
∗
α , which
involves neither C ′ nor q .
2. The strategy of the preceding proof is akin to the SL-resolution pro-
cedure of logic programming.
For some doctrines whose Blake canonical form does not satisfy v∗ = v′
one can still see that suspicious derivations of belief, i. e. from unsatisfiable
conjunctions, are never behind the decision of accepting or rejecting certain
literals. An interesting example is what can be called the doctrine of ex-
istence and uniqueness:∨
p∈Π+
p, (39)
p ∨ q, for any two different p, q ∈ Π+. (40)
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That is, some p ∈ Π+ is true, and not two of them are true at the same
time. Notice that the Blake canonical form contains nothing more than
these clauses, since no resolution is possible. Let us assume that a particular
p ∈ Π+ is accepted, that is v∗p > v∗p . In contrast to what happened for the
doctrine (28), here we can see that v∗p is always strictly larger than min(v
∗
q , v
∗
q )
—and therefore strictly larger than min(vq, vq)— for any q ∈ Π+ . In fact,
on the one hand, the inequality v∗p > v
∗
p obviously implies v
∗
p > min(v
∗
p, v
∗
p).
On the other hand, for any q ∈ Π+ \ {p} , the invariance of v∗ by the
transformation v 7→ v′ allows to write v∗p > v∗p ≥ v∗q ≥ min(v∗q , v∗q ), where
the central inequality comes from the implication q → p , which is contained
in (40).
These arguments can be generalized into the following result:
Corollary 4.9. Let us assume that the following condition is satisfied for
a given p ∈ Π :
For any C,C ′ ∈ D and q ∈ Π \ {p} satisfying p, q ∈ C and q ∈ C ′ ,
one has either (a) or (b ′ ) or both of them:
(a) there exists C1 ∈ D such that p ∈ C1 ⊆ C ∨q C ′ ;
(b ′ ) there exists C2 ∈ D such that p ∈ C2 ⊆ (C \ {p} ∪ {p}) ∨q C ′ .
In such a situation, v∗p > v
∗
p implies v
∗
p = v
′
p ; therefore, p is never accepted
on the basis of unsatisfiable conjunctions.
Proof. It suffices to show that condition (b ′ ) allows to go from the inequality
v∗p > v
∗
p to that of condition (b) of the preceding theorem. In fact, the
invariance of v∗ by the transformation v 7→ v′ allows to write v∗p > v∗p ≥
minα∈C2\{p} v
∗
α ≥ minα∈C∨
q
C′ \ {p} v
∗
α .
One easily checks that the hypothesis of the preceding corollary is satisfied
by any literal in the doctrine of existence and uniqueness, but not by literal
p in the doctrine (28).
From now on, all revised valuations will be assumed to be computed on
the basis of the Blake canonical form of the doctrine under consideration
(or any ∗-equivalent prime conjunctive normal form), this form being supple-
mented with all tertium non datur clauses. Since we are dealing with prime
forms, having the equality v∗p = v
′
p guarantees that the degree of belief v
∗
p
does not derive from unsatisfiable conjunctions. When this equality holds
for any initial valuation v , we will say that the doctrine under consideration
is unquestionable for p. If this is the case for any literal p , then we will
say simply that the doctrine is unquestionable. As we have been seeing,
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sometimes the equality v∗p = v
′
p can fail to hold for certain valuations v , but
one can still guarantee that it holds whenever p is accepted according to v∗ ;
in that case we will say that the doctrine is unquestionable for p when
accepted.
The following extendability result can be seen as a good property of
unquestionable doctrines with respect to the notion of definite consistency
of a partial truth assignment:
Theorem 4.10. For an unquestionable doctrine, every definitely consistent
partial truth assignment v can be extended to a consistent total truth assign-
ment u. Furthermore, for any literal p that is undecided by v one can choose
u so that up = 1.
Proof. Let us begin by extending v to w with the values wp = 1 and wp = 0.
Let us consider now the transformed valuation w′ . For any q with wq = 1
one has certainly w′q = 1. We claim that for such a q one has also w
′
q ≤ 12 .
In fact, since wq = 1 − wq = 0, the only way to get the contrary, that is
w′q = 1, would be having a clause C with q ∈ C and wα = 1 for any
α ∈ C \ {q} . Therefore, we would have wα = 0 for any α ∈ C . Since
wα differs from vα only for α = p, p , and wp = 1, we get vα = 0 for all
α ∈ C except possibly one undecided literal (namely p), which contradicts
the assumed definite consistency of v .
Let us consider now the valuation vˆ = µ(w′), where it should be recalled
that µ(w′) means the partial truth assignment that represents the basic
decision associated with w′ . The preceding arguments entail that vˆ is an
extension of w , and therefore it is also an extension of v . On the other hand,
the unquestionability of the doctrine ensures that w′ = w∗ , and Corollary 3.7
ensures that vˆ = µ(w′) = µ(w∗) is definitely consistent. Since vˆ contains
strictly less undecided literals than v , and the set of literals is finite, it is
clear that iterating this procedure will eventually produce a consistent total
truth assignment.
4.4 Definite Horn doctrines. A conjunctive normal form Φ(D) is said
to have a definite Horn character when every clause C ∈ D contains
exactly one element of Π+ . This property is easily seen to be preserved by
the operations of absorption and resolution. As a consequence, it is inherited
by the corresponding Blake canonical form. So, the latter has a definite Horn
character if and only if there exists a logically equivalent conjunctive normal
form with the same property. In such a situation, we can say that we are
dealing with a definite Horn doctrine. As we will see, for such doctrines one
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can arrive at consistent decisions by means of another criterion besides the
one given at the end of § 2.2.
For a definite Horn doctrine, the restriction of v∗ to Π+ is easily seen
to depend only on the restriction of v to Π+ . More generally, this happens
when every clause C ∈ D contains at most one element of Π+ , in which case
one speaks of a (simple) Horn character. In contrast, the properties below
require a definite Horn character.
Proposition 4.11. For a definite Horn doctrine one has
max
p∈Π+
v∗p ≤ max
q∈Π+
vq. (41)
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 3.8 by taking u in the following
way: up = 1 and up = 0 for any p ∈ Π+ . The consistency of this truth
assignment is an immediate consequence of the doctrine having a definite
Horn character.
For definite Horn doctrines, one can arrive at definitely consistent deci-
sions by considering only the restriction of v∗ to Π+ . For every η in the
interval 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 we define the unilateral decision of margin η in the
following way: For any p ∈ Π+ ,
p is accepted and p is rejected whenever v∗p > η, (42)
p is rejected and p is accepted whenever v∗p < η, (43)
p and p are left undecided whenever v∗p = η. (44)
Theorem 4.12. For a definite Horn doctrine, and any η in the interval
0 ≤ η ≤ 1, the unilateral decision of margin η associated with the upper
revised valuation is always definitely consistent.
Proof. According to the definition of definite consistency, we have to show
that for each C ∈ D and every p ∈ C , if all α ∈ C \ {p} are rejected, then
p is accepted. To this effect, we will show that assuming p not accepted and
all α ∈ C \ {p} rejected leads to contradiction. Now, for a definite Horn
doctrine all clauses have the form C = {r} ∪ S , with r ∈ Π+ and S ⊂ Π+ .
Since v∗ is ensured to satisfy the inequalities (8), we can write
v∗r ≥ min
s∈S
v∗s (45)
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In order to arrive at the desired contradiction we will distinguish two cases:
(a) p = r ; and (b) p ∈ S .
Case (a): p = r . In this case, p = r not accepted means that v∗r ≤ η , and
all α ∈ C \ {p} rejected means all s ∈ S accepted, i. e. v∗s > η . By plugging
these inequalities in (45) we arrive at the false conclusion that η > η .
Case (b): p ∈ S . In this case, r is rejected, so that v∗r < η , and the
s ∈ S are either accepted or not rejected, so that v∗s ≥ η . Therefore, we also
arrive at the false conclusion that η > η .
Compared with the bilateral decision criterion (4–5), the unilateral one
(42–44) leaves much less room for undecidedness. For the bilateral criterion,
increasing η has the effect of thickening the region of undecidedness. In con-
trast, for the unilateral criterion it has only the effect of moving the bound-
ary. This happens at the expense of disregarding the evidence in favour of p
for p ∈ Π+ . So, the unilateral criterion may accept p in spite of a stronger
evidence in favour of p , or it may reject p in spite of p having a weaker evi-
dence than p . On the other hand, the extent of such discrepancies is limited
as stated in the following result:
Proposition 4.13. The unilateral decisions associated with a definite Horn
doctrine are related to the bilateral ones in the following ways: (a) For any
p ∈ Π+ satisfying vp + vp ≥ 1, if p is accepted [resp. not rejected ] by the
bilateral decision of margin η , then p is accepted [resp. not rejected ] by the
unilateral decision of margin (1+η)/2. (b) For any p ∈ Π+ , if p is accepted
[resp. not rejected ] by the unilateral decision of margin η ≥ η0 , then p is
also accepted [resp. not rejected ] by the bilateral decision of margin η − η0 ,
where η0 := maxq∈Π+ vq .
Proof. In order to obtain part (a) it suffices to notice that vp + vp ≥ 1
implies v∗p + v
∗
p ≥ 1 and therefore v∗p ≥ [ (v∗p−v∗p) + 1 ] / 2. Part (b) is a
consequence of the inequality v∗p − v∗p ≥ v∗p − η0 , which follows immediately
from (41).
4.5 Autarkic sets. A set Σ ⊂ Π will be said to be autarkic for a con-
junctive normal form Φ(D) when it has the following properties:
(a) Σ does not contain at the same time a literal p and its negation p ;
(b) for any clause C ∈ D , if C contains p for some p ∈ Σ , then C contains
also some q ∈ Σ . Such a situation arises also in satisfiability theory, where
one calls then autarkic the partial truth assignment u that sets up = 1 and
up = 0 for p ∈ Σ and up = 12 (undecided) for p ∈ Π \ (Σ ∪ Σ) [20 ].
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Again, the property of autarky is preserved by the operations of ab-
sorption and resolution (checking it is a little exercise). As a consequence,
it passes on to the corresponding Blake canonical form. So, Σ ⊂ Π is au-
tarkic for the latter if and only if it is autarkic for some logically equivalent
conjunctive normal form. In such a situation, we can say simply that Σ is
autarkic for the given doctrine.
For a definite Horn doctrine, Π+ is easily seen to be an autarkic set.
This is a particular case of the following more general fact: if u is a truth
assignment consistent with D , then Σ = {α ∈ Π | up = 1 } is an autarkic
set. Generally speaking, however, autarkic sets need not decide on every
issue. Even so, their definition allows for the following generalization of
Proposition 3.8:
Proposition 4.14. An autarkic set Σ has the property that
max
p∈Σ
v∗p ≤ max
q∈Σ
vq. (46)
Proof. Since v∗ is obtained by iterating the transformation v 7→ v′ , it suf-
fices to show that this transformation has the following property analogous
to (46): v′p ≤ maxq∈Σ vq for any p ∈ Σ . This follows immediately from
(7) because, by definition, Σ being autarkic requires every clause C that
contains p with p ∈ Σ to contain also some q ∈ Σ , which ensures that
minα∈C,α6=p vα ≤ maxq∈Σ vq .
Theorem 4.15. Assume that the original valuation satisfies
min
p∈Σ
vp − max
p∈Σ
vp > η, (47)
for some autarkic set Σ and some η ∈ [0, 1). In this case, the decision
of margin η associated with the upper revised valuation v∗ accepts every
proposition in Σ .
Proof. By combining (46), (47) and part (c) of Theorem 3.2, it follows that
min
p∈Σ
v∗p − max
p∈Σ
v∗p > η, (48)
which implies v∗p − v∗p > η for any p ∈ Σ .
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Theorem 4.16. Assume that the original valuation satisfies
vp = 1, vp = 0, for any p ∈ Σ , (49)
where Σ is an autarkic set. In this case, the upper revised valuation v∗ has
the following properties: (a) For any p ∈ Σ one has also v∗p = 1 and v∗p = 0.
(b) For any q ∈ Π such that neither q nor q belongs to Σ , the upper revised
value v∗q coincides with the value which is obtained for a modified doctrine
that leaves out any clause that contains some element of Σ ∪Σ .
Proof. Part (a) is a direct consequence of Proposition 4.14 and part (c) of
Theorem 3.2. In order to prove part (b) it suffices to show that one can leave
out the clauses that contain some element of Σ ; in fact, by the definition of
an autarkic set, those that contain an element of Σ are ensured to contain
also some element of Σ . The statement of part (b) will be obtained by
showing that it holds for all the iterates v
(n)
q with n ≥ 1. In this connection,
we will make use of the fact that v
(n)
p = 0 for any p ∈ Σ and any n ≥ 0,
which follows from part (a) because of the inequality v ≤ v(n) ≤ v∗ . Let us
assume that neither q nor q belongs to Σ . Recall that v
(n)
q is given by
v(n)q = max
C∈D
C3q
min
α∈C
α6=q
v
(n−1)
α . (50)
We claim that the value that results from this formula is not altered if the
max operator of the right-hand side forgets about any clause C that contains
some p in Σ . In fact, we know that v
(n−1)
p = 0 and p 6= q (because of the
assumption that q 6∈ Σ ). Therefore, we get minα∈C,α6=q vα(n−1) = 0, which
entails that claim.
4.6 Duality. The lower revised valuation ∗v announced in § 2.4 is obtained
by means of a dual method —somehow it might be more appropriate to
say ‘codual’— which is based on the fact that the doctrine, i. e. (1) being
true, provides the following implications originated at p (which should be
compared to (3) ):
p →
∨
α∈C
α 6=p
α, (51)
for any C ∈ D such that p ∈ C . Such implications can be dealt with by
means of a principle dual to (P) that can be stated in the following way:
(Q) Consider an implication of the form p → ∨α∈Σ α with Σ ⊂ Π .
As soon as the right-hand side is not always satisfied, this implication
Deciding about logically constrained issues, § 5 31
restricts the degree of belief of p to be less than or equal to the
maximum degree of belief of the disjuncts α .
This leads to a downward revision of the degrees of belief according to the
transformation v → ′v defined by the formula
′vp = min
C∈D
C3p
max
α∈C
α 6=p
vα, (52)
whose iteration leads to the lower revised valuation ∗v .
Equivalently, ∗v is given by the formula ∗vp = 1− vˆ∗p , where vˆ is related
to v by the formula vˆp = 1 − vp ( vˆ believes p to the extent that v does
not believe p). This characterization allows to obtain the results for ∗v from
those for v∗ .
When v is a balanced valuation, then ∗vp = 1 − v∗p , so that ∗vp −∗vp =
v∗p − v∗p . Therefore, the upper and lower revised valuations lead then exactly
to the same decisions.
5 Application to specific domains
In this section we apply the preceding ideas and results to three specific
domains. Unfortunately, there is no space in this article for developing other
applications.
5.1 One proposition being equivalent to the conjunction of two
other ones. This is the problem with which we started the article, i. e. Π+ =
{p, q, t} with the doctrine t ↔ (p ∧ q). By rewriting the connective ↔ in
terms of ∧,∨,¬ , one easily arrives at the corresponding Blake canonical
form, which has a definite Horn character:
(p ∨ q ∨ t) ∧ (p ∨ t) ∧ (q ∨ t) (53)
The one-step revision transformation, which uses the clauses above and
also the tertium non datur ones, is given by
v′p = max (vp, vt), v
′
p = max (vp,min(vq, vt)), (54)
v′q = max (vq, vt), v
′
q = max (vq,min(vp, vt)), (55)
v′t = max (vt,min(vp, vq)), v
′
t = max (vt, vp, vq). (56)
One easily sees that the equality v∗ = v′ holds whenever v satisfies the
following inequalities: vt ≤ vp , vt ≤ vq , vt ≥ vp , vt ≥ vq . More particularly,
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it holds whenever v is an aggregate of several components satisfying all of
these inequalities. When the component valuations are all-or-none and non-
contradictory —i. e. satisfying vα+vα ≤ 1 for any α— these inequalities hold
whenever these valuations are definitely consistent. Under this assumption
—that is quite reasonable in the jury scenario of § 1.1— the doctrine (53) is
therefore unquestionable in the sense of § 4.3. In the general case, one has
only v∗ = v′′ .
As a particular example, let us consider the following aggregate of con-
sistent truth assignments:
(vp, vq, vt; vp, vq, vt) = .30 (1, 1, 1; 0, 0, 0) + .40 (1, 0, 0; 0, 1, 1) (57)
+ .25 (0, 1, 0; 1, 0, 1) + .05 (0, 0, 0; 1, 1, 1)
= (.70, .55, .30; .30, .45, .70).
As one can see, these collective degrees of belief result in the inconsistent
decision of accepting both p and q but rejecting t . In contrast, the corre-
sponding upper revised valuation, namely
(v∗p, v
∗
q , v
∗
t ; v
∗
p, v
∗
q , v
∗
t ) = (.70, .55, .55; .55, .70, .70), (58)
results in the consistent decision of accepting p and rejecting both q and t .
This decision holds up to a margin of .15, above which all three issues are left
undecided. The classical example of § 1.1 results in all upper revised values
being equal to exactly the same value, namely 2
3
, so that all three issues are
then undecided even for a vanishing margin. All of this is in agreement with
the concept of definite consistency defined in § 2.2.
5.2 Equivalence relation on a set A. Here the set of atomic proposi-
tions is Π+ = { exy | x, y ∈ A, x 6= y } , where exy stands for the proposition
‘x is equivalent to y ’. In order to follow the standard definition of an equiv-
alence relation, one should include also the propositions exx , and constrain
them to being true; however, this goes against our convention (D2) of avoid-
ing unit clauses, which is why the definition of Π+ considers only pairs xy
with x 6= y . The doctrine requires that for any pairwise different x, y, z ∈ A
one must have: exy ∧ eyz → exz (transitivity) and exy → eyx (symmetry).
This is equivalent to identifying exy with eyx and adopting the following
clauses:
exy ∨ eyz ∨ exz, for any pairwise different x, y, z ∈ A. (59)
This doctrine has a definite Horn character and has the following autarkic
sets: Π+ itself; Π− = { exy | x, y ∈ A, x 6= y } ; Σa = { eax | x ∈ A, x 6= a }
for any a ∈ A .
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We claim that this doctrine is disjoint-resolvable in the sense defined
in § 4.2, and that its Blake canonical form, with the tertium non datur clauses
included, consists of all clauses of the form
ex0x1 ∨ ex1x2 ∨ · · · ∨ exn−1xn ∨ ex0xn , (60)
with n ≥ 1 and all xi (0 ≤ i ≤ n) pairwise different (which restricts n
to be less than or equal to the number of elements of A). In the follow-
ing we will refer to such sequences x0x1 . . . xn as non-cyclic paths from
x0 to xn , and a generic non-cyclic path will be denoted by means of the
greek letter γ . In order to establish the preceding claim it suffices to check
that: (i) starting from (59) one can arrive at (60) for any non-cyclic path by
using only disjoint resolution; and (ii) any further resolution does not add
any new clause (i. e. the would-be new clause is absorbed by some clause of
the form (60) ). The last statement can also be strengthened to show that
condition (a) of Thm. 4.8 is satisfied for any of the propositions exy and exy .
As a consequence, v∗ coincides with the result of applying once the transfor-
mation v 7→ v′ determined by the Blake canonical form, which makes this
doctrine unquestionable in the sense of § 4.3.
More particularly, the values of v∗(exy) can be obtained by considering
all possible non-cyclic paths γ from x to y and applying the formula
v∗(exy) = max
γ
min
0≤i<n
v(exixi+1). (61)
These values are easily seen to satisfy
v∗(exz) ≥ min (v∗(exy), v∗(eyz)) for any x, y, z . (62)
As one can easily check, this inequality is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the following binary relations Eη (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) to be equivalence relations:
xy ∈ Eη ≡ v∗(exy) ≥ η. (63)
These facts are closely related to the definite consistency of the unilateral
decisions of margin η considered in § 4.4. In fact, one can easily check that:
Eη coincides with the set of pairs xy such that exy is accepted by an unilat-
eral decision of margin smaller but near enough to η , and that this decision
is definitely consistent if and only if Eη is an equivalence relation. Obvi-
ously, the equivalence relations Eη become progressively finer as η grows
(i. e. η < ζ implies Eζ ⊆ Eη in the sense of subsets of A×A). What we are
obtaining is the so-called single-link method of cluster analysis [13 : 7.3 ]. This
method is usually formulated in terms of the “dissimilarities” dxy = 1−v(exy)
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and d∗xy = 1 − v∗(exy). The inequality (62) corresponds to the inequal-
ity d∗xz ≤ max(d∗xy, d∗yz) that defines the so-called “ultrametric” distances.
The characterization given by Theorem 3.3 corresponds to the well-known
fact that the ultrametric distance given by the single-link method is char-
acterized by the property of being “subdominant” to the original dissimi-
larities d [13 : 8.3 ]. When looking at these correspondences, one must bear
in mind that in cluster analysis it is customary to consider the parameter
δ = 1− η rather than η .
However, all of this is achieved at the expense of disregarding any evidence
for exy , independently of its being stronger or weaker than the evidence
for exy . In contrast, the bilateral criterion looks at the balance of these
evidences. The values of v∗(exy), which are required to this effect, can be
obtained by considering non-cyclic paths γ from x to y with the special
feature that exactly one of the links is marked as negative; the formula to be
applied is similar to (61) but v(exixi+1) is replaced by v(exixi+1) for the link
that is marked as negative:
v∗(exy) = max
γ
max
0≤k<n
min
0≤i<n
{
v(exixi+1), if i 6= k;
v(exixi+1), if i = k.
(64)
By the way, from (61) and (64) it is clear that having v(exy) < v(exy) for any
two different x, y ∈ A implies the same property for v∗ , which ensures that
the basic decision associated with v∗ accepts exy for all x, y ; this improves
upon the result contained in Theorem 4.15 for η = 0.
In contrast to the unilateral criterion, the bilateral one does not result in
a complete hierarchy of equivalence relations going all the way from a single
class of equivalence to as many classes as objects being classified. Instead,
one obtains a hierarchy where the coarsest equivalence (corresponding to
η = 0) may already be made of several classes.
This provides a form of cluster analysis where dissimilarity is not simply
the lack of similarity, but it plays its own role. In particular, this acts against
falling into the ‘stringy’ clusters typical of the unilateral single-link method.
Besides, this point of view is also especially suitable for dealing with missing
data.
5.3 Total order on a set A. Here, Π+ = { pxy | x, y ∈ A, x 6= y } , where
pxy stands for the proposition ‘x is preferred to y ’. The doctrine requires
that for any pairwise different x, y, z ∈ A one must have: pxy ∧ pyz → pxz
(transitivity), pxy → pyx (asymmetry) and pxy → pyx (completeness).
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In normal form, they read as follows:
pxy ∨ pyz ∨ pxz, for any pairwise different x, y, z ∈ A; (65)
pxy ∨ pyx, for any two different x, y ∈ A; (66)
pxy ∨ pyx, for any two different x, y ∈ A, (67)
where the last one does not have a Horn character.
Similarly to the case of an equivalence relation, this doctrine is also dis-
joint–resolvable and unquestionable. Its Blake canonical form, with the ter-
tium non datur clauses included, consists of all clauses of the form
px0x1 ∨ px1x2 ∨ . . . ∨ pxn−1xn ∨ px0xn , (68)
where x0x1 . . . xn is a non-cyclic path, together with all clauses that are ob-
tained from (68) by replacing one or more pxixi+1 by pxi+1xi , and/or replac-
ing px0xn by pxnx0 (i. e. by identifying pxy with pyx for any two different
x, y ∈ A).
Let us remark also that applying Theorem 4.10 to this domain gives
the finite case of the well-known theorem of Edward Szpilrajn about the
extendability of partial orders to total orders [26 ].
In this case, our general method corresponds essentially to the voting
method introduced in 1997 by Markus Schulze [24 , 25 ; 27 : p. 228–232 ], often
called the method of paths. More precisely, when the original valuation is
balanced —which happens when every voter expresses a comparison (a pref-
erence or a tie) about each pair of options— we coincide with Schulze’s
method except for his subsequent treatment of indecisions; when the prefer-
ential information given by the voters is not complete, this procedure does
not coincide exactly with any of the variants that Schulze gives in [25 ], but it
has the same spirit. For more details, we refer the reader to [4, 5 ], where it
is shown that this procedure can be extended to a continuous rating method
that allows to sense the closeness of two candidates at the same time that it
allows to recognise certain situations that are quite opposite to a tie.
Here we will only draw attention to significance of certain autarkic sets
of this doctrine. In fact, one can easily check the autarkic character of any
set of the form Σ = { pxy | x ∈ X, y ∈ A \ X } , where X is any proper
subset of A . Applied to such sets, Theorem 4.15 ensures that the method
of paths satisfies the following majority property [4 : Thm. 10.1; 5 : Thm. 8.1 ]:
If for each member of X and every member of A \ X there are more than
half of the individual votes where the former is preferred to the latter, then
the resulting social ranking also prefers each member of X to every member
of A \X .
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6 Discussion and interpretation of the results
6.1 The variant that we have chosen as the main one is crucially based upon
the principle (P) stated in § 3.1: An implication of the form p← ∧α∈Σ α with
a satisfiable right-hand side gives to p at least the same degree of belief as
the weakest of the conjuncts α . This principle goes back to ancient philos-
ophy,where it was stated by saying that peiorem semper conclusio sequitur
partem. In more recent times, this idea has been brought back by several
authors in connection with different theories of degrees of belief. For a recent
overview of the subject, we refer to [12 ] and the articles therein.
Assuming that the doctrine is specified by means of a prime conjunctive
normal form, the above-mentioned principle allows to replace any given belief
valuation v by at least the v′ given by the max-min formula (7). In this
connection, it must be emphasized that the max operator of (7) does not
hinge on the dual principle (Q) of § 4.6. Instead, it appears simply as a result
of having several implications leading to p : being greater than or equal to
several values certainly implies being greater than or equal to the greatest of
them.
The valuation v′ obtained in this way is greater than or equal to the orig-
inal one v because we have systematically included the implications p ← p
(through the tertium non datur clauses p∨ p). By iterating the transforma-
tion v 7→ v′ we arrive at the invariant valuation v∗ that we call upper revised
valuation. For a fixed prime conjunctive normal form, v∗ is characterized as
the lowest of the valuations w that lie above v and satisfy the invariance
equation w′ = w (Theorem 3.3). On the other hand, when we consider dif-
ferent prime conjunctive normal forms, all of them logically equivalent to a
given doctrine, then v∗ is greatest when we take the Blake canonical form,
that is, the prime conjunctive normal form composed of all the prime impli-
cates (Proposition 4.3). The fact that the revised valuation v∗ satisfies the
equality v∗′ = v∗ can be seen as a general form of consistency with the doc-
trine; in particular, it entails that the decisions based upon the differences
v∗p − v∗p are always definitely consistent (Corollary 3.7).
The dual variant works in a similar way, but the non-decreasing trans-
formation v 7→ v′ is replaced by a non-increasing one v 7→ ′v . The resulting
lower revised valuation ∗v is characterized as the greatest of the valuations
w that lie below v and satisfy the invariance equation ′w = w . Somehow,
it would be appropriate for a skeptic believer, whereas the upper revised
valuation would correspond to an easy believer.
Many of the above underlying ideas can be found somewhere in the lit-
erature. Among the works closest to ours we can mention that of Nicholas
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Rescher about plausible reasoning [23 ]. However, and making abstraction
of certain differences in the setup, that work can be seen as starting from a
valuation w that already satisfies the equality w′ = w (which follows from
[23 : p. 15, (P4) ] because of the tertium non datur clauses); even so, the con-
sistency of the decisions based upon the differences wp−wp = v∗p − v∗p is not
obtained as a theorem, but it forms part of an axiom [23 : p. 16, (P6) ]. On the
other hand, the transformation w → w′ is still used —[23 : p. 19 ]— but only
as a means for extending the initial valuation to any compound proposition
with a zero initial value (which extension is done in a single step).
In contrast to Rescher and other authors, the valuations considered in the
present work are defined only for the members of Π , i. e. the basic propo-
sitions and their negations. In so doing, we take the view that any issue of
interest is included in Π , as a pair formed by an atom and its negation, and
that its logical connection to the other issues is specified by suitable clauses
in the doctrine.
Since it involves only the max and min operators, the transformation
v → v′ , and therefore also the transformation v → v∗ , have a purely or-
dinal character: The ordering of Π by v∗ depends only on its ordering
by v . In particular, the basic decision associated with v∗ is based wholly
on comparisons. However, one cannot say the same about the decisions that
require a certain positive margin. Such decisions make sense only for valua-
tions that have a cardinal character, as in the case of judgment aggregation,
where vp means the fraction of people who consider p true. Another result
whose meaningfulness requires cardinal valuations is the property of continu-
ity stated in part (a) of Theorem 3.2. By the way, this property ensures that
the accepted propositions remain accepted when the valuation v undergoes
slight variations.
Besides its making sense in the aggregation of individual judgments,
belief adjustment may already be taking place to some extent within
every individual. This is somehow unavoidable if the individuals are required
to produce consistent judgments, as it is usually the case. In particular,
this means that the individuals are already allowing some issues to influence
the others. In view of this, it is quite reasonable to dispense the aggrega-
tion method from complying with the condition of issue-by-issue aggregation
considered in § 1.3.
Our method disregards the condition of issue-by-issue aggregation but
complies with the following condition of respect for consistent majority deci-
sions: If the majority criterion applied to the original valuation v decides on
each issue and is consistent with the doctrine, then this decision is respected
(Theorem 3.9). Majority is here understood as having vp >
1
2
> vp (rather
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than simply vp > vp ). Furthermore, we have also a property of respect for
unanimity (Theorem 3.11): if a particular proposition is accepted by every
individual, and the individual judgments are consistent, then that proposi-
tion is also accepted by the collective judgment. Another good property is
the monotonicity given by Theorem 3.14.
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6.2 The fractional degrees of belief form a continuum of possibilities that
stretches over the all-or-none framework of classical logic. This allows for
p and p not being exactly the semantic negation of each other, but rather
the opposite, or antithesis, of each other. One may object that this is not
compatible with the excluded-middle principle p∨p . However, this principle
somehow loses its character just as fractional valuations come in. In fact, its
role in connection with the latter is only through the excluded-middle clauses
that we systematically include in the Blake canonical form; and this has only
the following two effects: (a) providing the trivial implications p → p and
p → p , through which the upper revised degrees of belief become larger
than or equal to the original ones; (b) forbidding any implication of the form
p ∧ p ∧ χ → t , which would be a gratuitous source of belief. Effect (b)
occurs because clauses are restricted to be prime, which prevents them from
containing p ∨ p .
When p is the opposite of p rather than its denial, then intermediate
degrees of belief can somehow be identified with belief in intermediate pos-
sibilities of fact. For instance, if p means ‘white’ and p means ‘black’
—and even more if p means ‘rather white’ and p means ‘rather black’—
then (wp, wp) = (0.3, 0.7) can be interpreted as giving belief to the gray that
combines white and black in the given proportions. When the valuation is
not balanced, then we are adding a sort of intensity of belief that can go from
a full lack of opinion to a self-contradictory one.
6.3 Let us look back on the special problem of collegial courts with which
we started the article. As we did in § 1.1 and § 5.1, we take as archetype the
doctrine t↔ p ∧ q , where t means ‘being guilty’ of a certain offence.
The data are the fractions of the jury who adhere to each of the proposi-
tions in question and their respective negations. These numbers can certainly
be viewed as degrees of collective belief. The problem is that the decision
that is naturally associated to this valuation, namely accepting α , and reject-
ing α , whenever vα > vα , may be inconsistent with the doctrine. This may
happen even when each member of the jury is expressing a consistent opinion.
Thus, in the particular case of the doctrine t↔ p∧ q we have seen examples
of consistent individual judgments that result in having at the same time
vp > vp and vq > vq (guilty by the standard premise-based criterion) but
vt < vt (not guilty by the standard conclusion-based criterion).
In contrast, the revised valuation v∗ has the property that the associated
decision is always definitely consistent with the doctrine in the sense defined
in § 2.2. In particular, for the doctrine t ↔ p ∧ q one is ensured to have
v∗p > v
∗
p and v
∗
q > v
∗
q (guilty by the revised premise-based criterion) if and
only if v∗t > v
∗
t
(guilty by the revised conclusion-based criterion).
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Of course, it may well happen that v∗α = v
∗
α , which does not allow to
decide between α and α . Such equalities are somehow easier to happen
than the analogous ones for the original valuation v . However, they can be
ruled out in the case of a unanimous consistent belief in α (Theorem 3.11),
and also, by continuity, if we are near enough to such unanimity.
The process that leads from the original degrees of belief v to the revised
ones v∗ can be seen as a quantitative virtual deliberation in accordance with
the implications contained in the doctrine and with principle (P).
The suitability of a process of this kind in the context of law courts was
advocated by L. Jonathan Cohen in his celebrated book The Probable and
the Provable [6 ].
For the doctrine t↔ p∧ q , the process of deliberation goes not only from
p and q to t , but also the other way (which makes it somewhat inappropriate
to call p and q the ‘premises’ and t the ‘conclusion’). Letting the implica-
tions t → p and t → q to come in conforms to the point of view expressed
by Kornhauser and Sager in [16 ]: “In actual deliberation, our commitments
to outcomes may sometimes be more basic and fundamental than our com-
mitment to the ‘principles’ or ‘reasons’ that ostensibly support them.”
The existence of such a direct belief about t makes p and q not inde-
pendent from each other. Such a situation could be avoided by submitting
p and q to the consideration of two separate juries (so that vt = vt = 0).
In such a setting, if both juries have the same number of members and none
of the jurors abstains, then the basic decision according to v∗ can be seen to
coincide with the standard premise-based one.
Another aspect where our method matches the standard principles of law
is the fact that the decision about t is obtained from a balance between the
arguments for t and those for t . In fact, this is the main idea of the adver-
sarial system of justice that operates in most jurisdictions. More specifically,
our basic decision criterion, i. e. that of margin 0, would correspond to the
notion of “preponderance of evidence”, also known as “balance of proba-
bilities”, that defines the standard of proof usually adopted in civil cases.
In contrast, the standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” typical of
criminal cases would correspond to a (perhaps unilateral) decision criterion
of margin η , with η near enough to 1.
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